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The limits of hybridity and the crisis of liberal peace 
Suthaharan Nadarajah (SOAS) and David Rampton (LSE) 
 
Abstract: 
 
Hybridity has emerged recently as a key response in IR and 
peace studies to the crisis of liberal peace. Attributing the 
failures of liberal peacebuilding to a lack of legitimacy deriving 
from uncompromising efforts to impose a rigid market 
democratic state model on diverse populations emerging from 
conflict, the hybrid peace approach locates the possibility of a 
‘radical’, post-liberal and emancipatory peace in the agency of 
the local and the everyday and ‘hybrid’ formations of 
international/liberal and local/non-liberal institutions, practices 
and values. However, this article argues, hybrid peace, emerging 
as an attempt to resolve a problem of difference and alterity 
specific to the context in which the crisis of liberal 
peacebuilding manifests, is a problem-solving tool for the 
encompassment and folding into globalising liberal order of 
cultural, political and social orders perceived as radically 
different and obstructionist to its expansion. Deployed at the 
very point this expansion is beset by resistance and crisis, hybrid 
peace reproduces the liberal peace’s logics of inclusion and 
exclusion, and through a reconfiguration of the international 
interface with resistant ‘local’ orders, intensifies the 
governmental and biopolitical reach of liberal peace for their 
containment, transformation and assimilation. 
 
Introduction 
 
Hybridity has emerged recently as a key response in IR and peace studies to the 
crisis of liberal peace. As a universalising modality in the wider architecture of a 
globally expansive liberal order, liberal peace achieved an intensified pre-
eminence in the 1990s and new millennium, even as its advance suffered critical 
setbacks. Amid the often fragile and illiberal outcomes of international 
peacebuilding, various resistances such as the post-9/11 transnational insurgency 
brought to fore the coercive character of liberal order making, exemplified by the 
Global War on Terror and interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is in this 
context that a supposedly novel and emancipatory turn to inter-connected hybrid, 
post-liberal, local, everyday and popular peacebuilding approaches has been 
ventured, claiming to eschew the orthodoxies and statist, territorial logic of 
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mainstream liberal peacebuilding and instead locating the possibility of peace in 
the agency of the local and the everyday, and ‘hybrid’ formations of liberal 
(international) and non-liberal (local) institutions, practices and values.1 However, 
claims to both novelty and a break with liberal peace orthodoxy are premature. 
Not only has the liberal peace itself long sought to engage with the local and other 
decentered or non-state forms as a deliberate transitional strategy of peace-, 
nation- and state-building,2 but, as an emergent critique notes, the hybrid peace 
approach reproduces the Eurocentrism, dualisms and hierarchies inherent to 
liberal peace; neglects the import of economic and social structures by locating the 
barriers to peace at the cognitive or ideational level; and overlooks how liberal 
peace has become structured into the very normative order of the international.3 
 
The critique advanced in this article focuses on the motor of hybrid peace – 
hybridity itself. It argues that hybrid peace, emerging as an attempt to resolve a 
problem of difference and alterity specific to the context in which the crisis of 
liberal peacebuilding manifests, is a problem-solving tool for the encompassment 
and folding into global liberal order of cultural, political and social orders 
perceived as radically different and obstructionist to its expansion. Deployed at the 
very point this expansion is beset by resistance and crisis, hybrid peace reproduces 
the liberal peace’s logics of inclusion and exclusion, and through a reconfiguration 
of the international interface with resistant ‘local’ orders, intensifies the 
                                                 
1 E.g. Roberto Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance: Its Emergence and Significance’, Global 
Governance, 18:1, (2012), pp. 21-38; Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid peace: The interaction between top 
down and bottom up peace’, Security Dialogue 41:4, (2010), pp. 391-412; Roger Mac Ginty, 
International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011); Audra Mitchell, ‘Quality/Control: International peace interventions and “the everyday”’, Review 
of International Studies, 37:4, (2011), pp. 1623-1645; Oliver P Richmond, A Post–Liberal Peace 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2011); Oliver P. Richmond ‘Peace Formation and Local Infrastructures for Peace’ 
Alternatives (online-before-print), (2013) pp. 1-17; Oliver P Richmond and Audra Mitchell (eds), 
Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); 
David Roberts, ‘Beyond the metropolis? Popular peace and post-conflict peacebuilding’, Review of 
International Studies, 37:5, (2011), pp. 2535-2556; V. Boege, A. Brown, K. Clements and A. Nolan, 
‘Building peace and political community in hybrid political orders.’ International Peacekeeping, 16:5 
(2009), pp. 599-615. 
2 E.g. Elizabeth M Bruch, ‘Hybrid Courts: Examining Hybridity Through a Post-Colonial Lens’, 
Boston University International Law Journal, 28:1, (2010), pp. 1-28; Thania Paffenholz ‘International 
peacebuilding goes local: analysing Lederach's conflict transformation theory and its ambivalent 
encounter with 20 years of practice.’ Peacebuilding (ahead-of-print), (2013), pp. 1-17; On the 1990s 
turn to the local, the indigenous and ‘social capital’ in international development programming, see 
Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke. ‘Participatory development and empowerment: the dangers of 
localism.’ Third world quarterly 21.2, (2000) pp. 247-268. 
3 David Chandler, ‘Peacebuilding and the politics of non-linearity: rethinking ‘hidden’agency and 
‘resistance’’Peacebuilding, 1:1, (2013), pp. 17-32; Vivienne Jabri, ‘Peacebuilding, the local and the 
international: a colonial or a postcolonial rationality?’ Peacebuilding, 1:1, (2013), pp. 3-16; Mark 
Laffey and Suthaharan Nadarajah, ‘The hybridity of liberal peace: States, diasporas and insecurity’, 
Security Dialogue 43:5, (2012), pp. 403-420; Meera Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism in the 
critique of the liberal peace’, Security Dialogue, 44:3 (2013), pp. 259-278. 
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governmental and biopolitical reach of liberal peace for their containment, 
transformation and assimilation. 
 
Through a selective engagement with hybridity that neglects the multilectical 
character of hybridisation and the long durée timeframe through which hybridity 
manifests, and instead concentrating on the contemporary dynamics in a 
presentist fashion, the hybrid peace approach fails to take seriously the historical 
co-constitution of the international, national and local and the relations of power 
that connect these in both peace and conflict. Instead, despite numerous caveats, 
the deployment of hybridity as a modality of peace turns on and produces a 
romanticised positioning of the local/everyday as the antithesis of the 
international and an also problematic effacement of the national, thereby 
obscuring the role of hybridity, the local and the everyday in the reproduction of 
oppression, contestation and violence, and how peace and conflict are not discrete 
phenomena but deeply interwoven in forms of political contestation and 
antagonism produced within overlapping and co-constituting liberal, nationalist 
and other assemblages. 
 
The article proceeds through five sections. The first sets out the context of crisis in 
liberal order making in which the turn to hybridity in IR and peace studies has 
emerged as a claimed critical and emancipatory response. The second examines 
the discursive recurrence of hybridity in the social sciences and identifies some 
immediate problems with its latest incarnation, hybrid peace. The third delineates 
and critiques core concepts and assumptions common to the post-liberal, hybrid 
and quotidian approach to peace, showing how it shares important commonalities 
with the liberal peace orthodoxy it defines itself against, including a liberal politics 
of inclusion and exclusion. The fourth section shows how the neat divisions 
between the local/everyday and the international/liberal inherent to hybridity-as-
peace rests on a romanticised and at times orientalised reading of the local and 
everyday as spaces divorced from the national and expressive of the indigenous, 
authentic and legitimate, a construction formed through the discourse of hybrid 
peace itself. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of its 
arguments. 
 
The turn to hybrid peace 
 
The recent turn to hybridity in IR and peace studies comes at a specific juncture in 
the global liberal peace project: one of uncertainty for advocates4 and ‘crisis’, 
                                                 
4 E.g. John G Ikenberry, ‘Liberal internationalism 3.0: America and the dilemmas of liberal world 
order’, Perspectives on Politics 7:1, (2009), pp. 71-87; Roland Paris, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, 
Review of International Studies 36:2, (2010), pp. 337-365. 
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according to critics.5 The past two decades have seen the ascendancy of an 
intensified West-led engagement in the global South through overlapping 
humanitarian, developmental, peacebuilding and securitised frameworks, the 
overall thrust of which has been the containment and transformation of 
problematic states and social orders so that they conform to, or at least do not 
threaten, the requisites of markets, democracy and rule of law.6 This post-Cold 
War intensification of global liberalism’s two centuries of engagement with its 
peripheries7 has generated a power/knowledge nexus, constituted by a network of 
aid donor and recipient states, UN agencies, international financial institutions, 
NGOs and myriad academic and policy research centres, that aligns diverse 
interests, calculations and practices with an ethical, if not moral, problem-solving 
mission to end the various conflagrations in the borderlands and interstices of a 
now explicitly globalising liberal order.8 However, an array of problems, including 
exacerbated conflict dynamics, developmental failure and localised and 
transnational resistances, some violent, has generated profound anxiety, if not 
crisis, for the liberal peace project, which has not abated despite rethinking and 
reformulating developmental, peacebuilding and humanitarian programming, 
most obviously in the shift from the Washington to the post-Washington 
Consensus which supposedly prioritised local ‘ownership’ and donor-recipient 
‘partnership’. This is not least as, at the same time, the Global War on Terror and 
interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere laid bare the violent, coercive 
and militarised character of a cosmetically pacific liberal order - whether order is 
understood as decentred or US-driven.9 
 
The crisis manifests in the fields of International Relations and global politics in 
sharply polarised and dissonant perspectives not only about liberal peace but the 
wider architecture of globalisation as an academic and socio-political-economic 
project. For example, it has been read variously as the inherently violent character 
                                                 
5 Neil Cooper, ‘On the crisis of liberal peace’, Conflict, Security & Development, 7:4, (2007), pp. 605-
616; Neil Cooper, Mandy Turner and Michael Pugh, ‘The end of history and the last liberal 
peacebuilder: a reply to Roland Paris’, Review of International Studies 37:4, (2011), pp. 1-13 
6 E.g. Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and 
Security. (London: Zed Books, 2001); Jabri, ‘Peacebuilding’; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, 
pp. 32-46; Jenny H. Peterson, ‘Creating Space for Emancipatory Human Security: Liberal Obstructions 
and the Potential of Agonism,’ International Studies Quarterly 57:2, (2012), pp. 318-328 
7 E.g. Ikenberry, ‘Liberal internationalism 3.0’, p. 71; Barry Hindess, ‘Liberalism – what’s in a name?’, 
in Wendy Larner and William Walters (eds) Global governmentality: governing international spaces 
(London: Routledge, 2004), p. 24. Nikolas Rose Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999), pp. 107-111; David Scott, Refashioning Futures: 
Criticism after Postcoloniality, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) 
8 Duffield, Global Governance; pp. 11-12 
9 Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy (Harvard 
University Press, 2004); Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life 
Live (London: Routledge, 2009); Iver B Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending, Governing the Global 
Polity: Practice, Mentality Rationality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010). 
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of liberal order itself,10 a momentary but surmountable setback in securing US 
hegemony-as-soft power,11 the hardwired failure of US imperial ambitions and 
contradictions in the globalisation project,12 or a questioning of the normative and 
empirical frameworks of the globalisation thesis itself.13 Inevitably, the most 
heated debates have been over peacebuilding itself.14 On one side are the project’s 
defenders who argue that despite the difficulties there is no alternative to liberal 
peace and call for a renewed commitment to its principles and aspirations and the 
refining of its implementation strategies.15 On the other side are diverse critics 
who see the project as an articulation of imperialism in a new form of western 
hegemony and neoliberal capitalist development.16 These debates implicitly or 
explicitly advocate renewed focus on firmer statebuilding with differing emphasis 
on a more gradual transitional institutionalization towards autonomy and/or on 
enhanced social welfare capacities. 
 
Alongside these debates is a school of thought which, building on the work of 
earlier generations of peace scholars17, stresses the significance of the local and the 
everyday and criticises liberal peacebuilding as statist, Eurocentric, domineering 
and top-down in its epistemological assumptions, practices and affects, but for 
whom peace can yet be achieved as a heterogeneous interface of 
global/international and local orders.18 For this now growing scholarship, liberal 
peace can be transcended and its narrow ethnocentric boundaries, technocratic 
tendencies and fixation with state and institution-building overcome to produce a 
more empathetic, responsive, culturally sensitive and ultimately radical peace 
encompassing the local, indigenous and quotidian experience, especially that of 
the subaltern categories, within conflict-affected spaces and societies.19 It is in this 
approach, broadly defined, that hybridity, and the local and everyday, have 
                                                 
10 Dillon and Reid, Liberal Way of War. 
11 Ikenberry, ‘Liberal internationalism 3.0’. 
12 Michael Mann, ‘The first failed empire of the 21st century’, Review of International Studies 30:4, 
(2004), pp. 631–653. 
13 Justin Rosenberg, ‘Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem’, International Politics, 42:1, (2005), pp. 
2-74. 
14 For overviews, see David Chandler, ‘The uncritical critique of ‘liberal peace’, Review of International 
Studies, 36:S1, (2010) pp. 137-155; Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid peace’, pp. 392-6. 
15 E.g. Paris, ‘Saving liberal peace’. 
16 E.g. Chandler, ‘The uncritical critique’; Cooper et al, ‘The end of history’; Michael Dillon and Julian 
Reid, ‘Global governance, liberal peace and complex emergence’, Alternatives 25:1 (2000), pp. 117-
145; Duffield, Global Governance; Michael Pugh, ‘The political economy of peacebuilding: a critical 
theory perspective’, International Journal of Peace Studies 10:2, (2005), pp. 23-42. 
17 E.g. Johan Galtung, Jon Paul Lederach, Elisse Boulding among others. See discussions in Chandler, 
‘Peacebuilding’; Mitchell, ‘Quality/Control’; Paffenholz ‘International peacebuilding’. 
18 For representative examples, see note 1. 
19 For overviews, see Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance’; Jenny H. Peterson, ‘A Conceptual 
Unpacking Of Hybridity: Accounting For Notions Of Power, Politics And Progress In Analyses Of 
Aid-Driven Interfaces’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 7:2, (2012), pp. 9-22. 
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become key vehicles for attempting this makeover of international peace 
intervention. 
 
The post-liberal or hybrid peace approach defines the crisis of liberal peace, at 
base, as one of legitimacy.20 International peacebuilding is characterised as 
coercive, ‘top-down’, technocratic, uncompromising and blind to the local 
conditions in which it is pursued. Centred on imposing the western model of the 
Weberian state on those unwilling or not ready to accept it, and for whom it is 
thus ‘alien’, liberal peacebuilding is held to favour the interests of local ‘elites’ and 
international interveners, rather than the majority who bear the weight of both 
conflict and liberal peace engagements. In this way, the latter are alienated from 
the state-in-formation, as they are alienated from the elites who manage it with 
and for international peacebuilders. This renders the liberal peace illegitimate and 
drives various resistances that make impossible its advance and sustainability. By 
contrast, hybrid peace – constituted by organic configurations fusing international 
and ‘local’ structures, practices, values and identities - is more ‘inclusive’ and 
participatory, emerges ‘bottom up’ and is therefore more legitimate for its bearers, 
even as it departs in different ways from the elusive ideal of liberal peace. Rather 
than a homogenising liberal peace, peacebuilders are therefore urged to recognise 
the possibility of the ‘plurality of peace’,21 each instance comprising a mutual 
accommodation of local and international institutions, practices and values, which 
is therefore legitimate in both contexts. In any case, the critique points out, hybrid 
configurations are the ‘reality’, even ‘inevitable’ outcomes, of liberal peace 
interventions, and the call is for these to be considered potential forms of, rather 
than obstacles to, generating peace.22 In this way, hybridity becomes the motor of 
sustainable peace at and between local and international levels, as well as a 
modality for overcoming liberal peacebuilding’s denial of autonomy to peripheral 
and local spaces and societies. (We examine below this posited contrast between 
liberal and hybrid peace, but note here how it is key to how the latter defines 
itself and its claims to ‘legitimacy’ and ‘emancipation’.) However, there are 
significant problems, considered next, with the articulation of hybridity both in 
terms of its lineage within broader fields of the humanities and social studies since 
the nineteenth century and its recent resurgence in IR and peace studies. 
 
The limits of hybridity 
 
                                                 
20 Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance’, p. 21; Boege et al, ‘Building Peace’; Mac Ginty, International 
Peacebuilding, p. 41; Richmond Post-Liberal Peace pp. 12-13; Oliver P Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal 
Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday,’ Review of International Studies, 35:3, (2009), pp. 557-580. 
21 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, p. 11. 
22 Belloni, ‘Hybrid peace governance’, p. 24; Richmond, Post-Liberal Peace, p. 17-19. 
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Hybridity is most closely associated with postcolonial thought,23 although it has a 
longer lineage in the humanities and social studies. In the nineteenth century the 
concept derived from biological conceptions of race and anxieties of colonial and 
imperial societies faced with prospects of a plural world and miscegenation.24 In 
the twentieth century both race and hybridity discourses took a culturalist turn25 
and were divided between forms of organic essentialism and intentionalist 
constructivism, with the latter seeking to eschew fixed notions of identity such as 
race and ethnicity through a critical lens particularly associated with various 
strands of postcolonial studies.26 ‘Hybrid peace’ is thus hybridity’s latest 
incarnation, albeit one connected in varying degrees to a postcolonial approach. In 
its discursive recurrence hybridity not only encompasses a varying and dissonant 
vocabulary,27 it also has been subject to persistent critique.28 Key for our analysis is 
that the almost endemic character of hybridisation should make us circumspect 
about hybridity’s deployment and usage.29 The theoretical framework adopted 
here is sympathetic to this critique insofar as we argue that hybridisation, which 
we equate with miscegenation,30 is a far more thoroughgoing, comprehensive and 
relentless historical process than is often allowed, in part as the related concepts of 
difference and alterity on which hybridity is dependent are the very grounds that 
make inquiry and understanding in the social sciences and humanities possible, as 
any relation of understanding involves engagement or fusion with another 
                                                 
23 E.g. Anjali Prabhu, Hybridity: Limits, Transformations, Prospects. (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007); 
Robert J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). 
24 David Theo Goldberg, ‘Heterogeneity and hybridity: Colonial legacy, postcolonial heresy’ in H. 
Schwarz and S. Ray (eds), A Companion to Postcolonial Studies (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 
pp. 72-86; Robert J.C. Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 1995). 
25 Prabhu, Hybridity; John Hutnyk, ‘Hybridity’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28:1, (2005) pp. 79-102. 
26 J. N. Pieterse, ‘Hybridity, so what? The anti-hybridity backlash and the riddles of recognition.’ 
Theory, Culture & Society 18:2-3, (2001) p. 236; Young, Colonial Desire, p. 5. 
27 Pieterse, ‘Hybridity, so what?’, pp. 220-224; Prabhu, Hybridity, p. 2. 
28 E.g. Ali Nobil Ahmad ‘Whose underground?’, Third Text, 15:54, (2001) pp. 71-84; Floya Anthias 
‘New hybridities, old concepts: the limits of ‘culture’’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24:4, (2001) pp. 
619-641; Arif Dirlik, ‘The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism’ 
Critical Inquiry, 20:2, (1994), pp. 328-356; Goldberg, ‘Heterogeneity and hybridity’; Vince P. Marotta 
‘The hybrid self and the ambivalence of boundaries’, Social Identities, 14:3, (2008) pp. 295-312; 
Katharyne Mitchell, ‘Different diasporas and the hype of hybridity.’ Environment and Planning D 15, 
(1997) pp. 533-554; Ella Shohat, ‘Notes on the "Post-Colonial"’, Social Text, 31/32 (1992), pp. 99-113; 
For a defence of hybridity, see Pieterse, ‘Hybridity, so what?’; Simone Drichel, ‘The time of 
hybridity’, Philosophy & Social Criticism 34:6 (2008) pp. 587-615; see also Stuart Hall, ‘When was 
“the post-colonial”? Thinking at the limit’ in Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti (eds), The Postcolonial 
Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons. (Routledge, 2002 [1996]), pp. 242-59. 
29 E.g. Jonathan Friedman, ‘Global Crises, the Struggle for Cultural Identity and Intellectual 
Porkbarrelling: Cosmopolitans versus Locals, Ethnics and Nationals in an era of De-Hegemonisation’ 
in P. Werbner and T. Modood (eds), Debating Cultural Hybridity. (London: Zed, 1997) pp. 70–89. 
30 E.g. Sankaran Krishna, Postcolonial insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the question of nationhood, 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Anne Raffin, ‘Postcolonial Vietnam: hybrid 
modernity.’ Postcolonial Studies 11.3 (2008) pp. 329-344; Michael. Watts, ‘Resource curse? 
Governmentality, oil and power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria.’ Geopolitics 9.1 (2004) pp. 50-80. 
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rationality, tradition, text, person etc.31 Yet this is not to dismiss hybridity (after 
all, we are not denying it is at work) but instead to ask why is it, given the always 
already hybrid constitution of social existence, the focus on hybridity intensifies at 
particular historical junctures and in particular ways; what are the contexts, 
frameworks, aims, goals and effects of the intermittent turn to hybridity, and 
specifically what is and is not included as hybrid? In short, what are the politics of 
invoking hybridity?32 
 
Hybrid peace approaches draw explicitly or implicitly on prominent theories in 
cultural and postcolonial studies that deploy hybridity, and related concepts such 
as diaspora, creolisation, metissage, mestizaje, etc,33 to processes of racial and 
cultural mixture. Exemplified by the works of Homi Bhabha, Stuart Hall and Paul 
Gilroy amongst others,34 these studies read hybridity as forms of ‘in-betweenness’ 
that break with, challenge and transgress essentialist and binary ideas of identity, 
and destabilise the hierarchical and exclusionary relations that rest on and 
reproduce these. Emerging out of the fusing of two differentiated – and often 
hierarchically positioned - elements, hybridity is seen as constituting a ‘third 
space’ that is not only irreducible to its constitutive elements, but is creative, 
assertive and productive of agency.35 In this way hybridity is claimed to ‘reveal, or 
even provide, a politics of liberation for subaltern constituencies.’36 
 
However, this emancipatory claim has drawn intense criticisms (some of which 
presage the arguments advanced here).37 A key problem is a depoliticising neglect 
of power. Anthias argues that the privileging of (a particular notion of) culture 
obscures other constructions of difference and hierarchy, such as gender and class, 
and, relatedly, the overemphasis on transgressive dynamics ‘underplays alienation, 
exclusion, violence and fundamentalism, particularly in situations of social 
                                                 
31 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (Continuum, 1998 [1975]); Bruce Kapferer, ‘Anthropology 
and the Dialectic of the Enlightenment: A Discourse on the Definition and Ideals of a Threatened 
Discipline’, Australian Journal of Anthropology, 18:1, (2006), pp. 87-8. 
32 Prabhu, Hybridity, pp. 14-15; Pieterse, ‘Hybridity, so what?’, p. 224. 
33 For discussions, see Prabhu, Hybridity; Kraidy, M.M. Hybridity, or the Cultural Logic of 
Globalization (Philadephia: Temple University Press, 2005). 
34 E.g. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (Abingdon: Routledge, 1994); Kuan-Hsing Chen and 
David Morley (eds), Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in cultural studies (Abingdon: Routledge, 1996); 
Stuart Hall, ‘When was “the post-colonial”’; Paul Gilroy, The black Atlantic: Modernity and double 
consciousness. (Harvard University Press, 1993). 
35 For example, for Bhabha it is the “interstitial passage between fixed identifications [that] opens up 
the possibility of a cultural hybridity that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed 
hierarchy” (Bhabha, ‘Location’ p. 4.) Hall and Gilroy, whose work on diaspora is more directly linked 
to issues of race, see cultural inbetweenness as not only undermining racialised (white) imaginaries of 
the nation-state and associated hierarchies, but empowering black and Asian migrants by turning 
positions of victimhood and marginalisation into ones of strength. For critiques of their work, see, e.g. 
Ahmad ‘Whose underground?’; Anthias, ‘New Hybridities’, p. 628,632; Mitchell, ‘Different 
diasporas’, p,537. 
36 Prabhu, Hybridity, p. xiv. 
37 See note 28. 
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asymmetry.’38 Hybridity does not necessarily entail reciprocal exchange or the 
diminishing of cultural hegemonies, but is uneven and selective across and within 
subaltern groups.39 The wider criticism is that by directing attention to localised 
interactions, as opposed to overarching structures, accounts of hybridity are 
disembodied from the totality – marked by material social and political 
inequalities - in which it is located, thereby tending to obscure the power relations 
and hierarchies constituting domineering orders such as capitalism and racism.40 
Other problems flow from the anti-essentialism linked to hybridity; the corollary 
of the celebrated unsettling of fixed readings of identity is the elevation of the 
hybrid over the non-hybrid, and transgression over social boundaries i.e. the 
generation of new hierarchies and boundaries (between the hybrid - open, 
tolerant, progressive - and the essentialist – parochial, provincial, reactionary).41 
The problem is well demonstrated in Latin American contexts where nationhood 
is officially articulated, albeit unevenly, in terms of hybridity (mestizaje), thereby 
marginalising indigenous peoples’ assertions of collective identity and political 
claims.42 Consequently, while some critics, such as Katherine Mitchell and Ella 
Shohat, acknowledge hybridity’s potential for resistance and progressive agendas, 
but question whether it can be always equated with these, given how it is open to 
appropriation by reactionary forces and thus ‘the consecration of hegemony,’43 
more forceful critics argue ‘hybridity-talk’ is itself complicit in the reproduction of 
hierarchy and domination – John Hutnyk, for example, sees hybridity as a 
conceptual tool ‘providing an alibi for lack of attention to politics, in a project 
designed to manage the cultural consequences of colonisation and globalisation.’44 
 
As a supposedly novel approach to international peacebuilding that breaks with 
liberal peace orthodoxy and its universalising ambition, the hybrid peace approach 
envisages a plurality of ‘locally legitimate’ peace pursued through context specific 
and mutually accommodative interfacings of the international and the local. 
However, there are a number of immediate problems with this articulation of 
hybridity. To begin with, the conception of international order inherent to this 
approach is remarkably reminiscent of the age of empire. Not only did imperial 
order rest on a heterogeneous set of locally specific arrangements and contexts and 
                                                 
38 Anthias, ‘New Hybridities’ p. 620; Shohat, ‘Notes’ p. 110. 
39 Ahmad, ‘Whose underground?’. 
40 Prabhu, Hybridity, p. xiv; Ahmad, ‘Whose underground?’; Hutnyk, ‘Hybridity’; Mitchell, ‘Different 
diasporas’; Shohat, ‘Notes’. 
41 Ahmad, ‘Whose underground?’; Marotta, ‘The hybrid self’; Shohat, ‘Notes’, pp. 109-110; See 
discussion in Drichel, ‘The time of hybridity’, pp. 603-6. 
42 Kraidy, Hybridity, pp. 51-55; Andrew Canessa, ‘Contesting Hybridity: Evangelistas and Kataristas 
in Highland Bolivia’ Journal of Latin American Studies, 32:1, (2000), pp. 115-144; Charles R. Hale, 
‘Does multiculturalism menace? Governance, cultural rights and the politics of identity in Guatemala.’ 
Journal of Latin American Studies 34.3, (2002), pp. 485-524. 
43 Shohat, ‘Notes’ p. 110; Anthias, ‘New Hybridities’; Mitchell, ‘Different diasporas’, p. 533. 
44 Hutnyk, ‘Hybridity’, p. 92; Ahmad, ‘Whose underground?’; Dirlik, ‘The Postcolonial Aura’ p. 355-
6. 
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differentiating hierarchies within its wider architecture, indirect rule was ‘a 
practice of government which worked through institutions that relied on what 
were thought to be indigenous customs and structures of authority’.45 This was, or 
increasingly became, more than an administrative necessity; it reflected the 
inescapable dilemma inherent to rule ‘at a distance’ i.e. between governing too 
much and not enough.46 To be clear, we are certainly not equating the work of 
hybrid peace scholars with advocacy of a benevolent new imperialism.47 Rather, in 
pointing to the similarities between how hybridity constituted the answer to 
problems of imperial rule and how it has emerged today as a response to the crisis 
of global liberal order, we are raising a question (explored in subsequent sections) 
as to what extent hybrid peace constitutes a ‘radical critique’ of liberal 
peacebuilding,48 not least as hybridity, as conceived of here, has always been 
inherent to the heterogeneity of liberal rule.49 
 
Second, hybridity is not inherently emancipatory, but as discussed above, this very 
much depends on the historical and social context and, indeed, hybridity is 
perfectly given over to orders of mastery and domination, such as colonialism, 
capitalist accumulation and majoritarian nationalism.50 Hybrid peace scholars 
recognise this,51 yet in advancing hybridity as an engine of peace, they claim a 
discernible distinction between hybridity-as-emancipation and hybridity-as-
oppression.52 As we show below this is not only questionable, but when offered, it 
represents a liberal politics of inclusion and exclusion. Third, and relatedly, the 
deployment of hybridity for peace turns on a delineation of the local and the 
international/global that is both Eurocentric53 and denies the deeper and more 
thoroughgoing hybridisation of the world consequent to two centuries of imperial 
expansion, decolonisation and liberal order building. Despite regular caveats that 
hybridity is everywhere,54 the approach nonetheless advances a set of analytical 
and conceptual binaries (liberal/illiberal, international/local, modernity/tradition, 
peace/conflict, coercion/resistance, etc) through which hybridity is to be read and 
pursued for peace.55 This is in striking contrast to postcolonial deployments of 
                                                 
45 Barry Hindess, ‘Citizenship and Empire’, in T. B. Hansen and F. Stepputat (eds) Sovereign Bodies: 
Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 
p. 253. 
46 Rose, Powers, p. 70. 
47 E.g. Robert Cooper, ‘The new liberal imperialism’ The Observer (7 April 2002). 
48 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, p. 1; Richmond Post-Liberal Peace, p. 103. 
49 Hindess, ‘Liberalism – what’s in a name’, p. 30. 
50 Bruch, ‘Hybrid Courts’ pp. 5-7; Mitchell, ‘Different diasporas’, pp. 553-4; Canessa, ‘Contesting 
Hybridity’. 
51 E.g. Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance’, p. 25; Richmond, Post-Liberal Peace, p. 123,128-9. 
52 E.g. Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, p. 210; Richmond, Post-Liberal Peace, pp. 18-19. 
53 Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars’. 
54 Belloni, ‘Hybrid peace governance’, p. 23; Boege et al, ‘Building Peace’, p. 613, fn.12; Mac Ginty, 
International Peacebuilding, pp. 72-73. 
55 Ibid, p. 22; Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid peace’; Richmond, Post-Liberal Peace, pp. 18-19. 
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hybridity – for example, as ‘in-betweenness’ – that have sought to critique such 
taken-for-granted dichotomies and boundaries on which dominant accounts of 
social relations rest.56 Thus, although there is occasional recognition of hybridity 
within the local, indigenous and everyday, hybridity in a fuller sense is seen as yet 
incomplete and only to be achieved through international peace frameworks. In 
this way, hybridity is deployed ‘in shallow terms, as a domestic phenomenon 
referring to external relations with local communities deploying non-liberal forms 
of decision-making or conflict resolution.’57 By way of illustrative examples, 
hybrid peace studies have included discussion of struggles for local customary 
justice, rights of indigenous communities, traditional kinship systems, religious 
authorities and networks, patronage systems with key examples including Gacaca 
courts in Rwanda, the Loya Jirga councils in Afghanistan and the uma lulic ‘sacred 
house’ system in East Timor.58 While hybrid peace scholars are not without 
sensitivity to how these emerge from or are transformed by their engagement with 
the international,59 what is notable is such examples are always discussed with 
reference to levels of ‘indigeneity’, and thus authenticity, which become 
yardsticks for measuring the extent to which these remain pure and legitimate or 
sullied and compromised (‘bastardised’) by the extent of their engagement with 
the international.60 An example is Roger Mac Ginty’s account of Hezbollah as an 
international-local hybrid (in which ‘indigeneity’ is compromised) because of the 
Lebanese actor’s relatively recent political support from Iran, rather than in terms 
of its very inception and constitution through historical processes of 
hybridisation.61 Oliver P. Richmond coins the term ‘local-local’ to refer to the 
‘deep civil society’ that is ‘not merely a veneer of internationally sponsored local 
actors and NGOs’ and which, whilst neglected by international peacebuilders, is 
key to genuine emancipation and peace.62 Finally, hybridity-as-peace neglects the 
implications of hybridity as an open-ended and unpredictable process.63 Taking 
seriously this sense of movement, of hybridisation, calls into question the idea of 
an inherently pacific configuration amid the ceaseless workings of power and 
hierarchy at and between local, national and global levels.64 Yet, as demonstrated 
below, this is neglected in the historical or categorical treatment of those 
constructs serving as exemplars of hybrid peace. 
 
                                                 
56 Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars’, pp. 266-8. 
57 Laffey and Nadarajah, ‘Hybridity of liberal peace’, p. 406. 
58 E.g. Mac Ginty, International peacebuilding, pp. 47-67; Richmond, Post-Liberal Peace, pp. 152-
185. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid, pp. 62-4; Richmond, Post-Liberal Peace, pp. 14, 51. 
61 Ibid, p. 181. 
62 Richmond, ‘Eirenism’, p. 566; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, pp. 185-7. 
63 Hutnyk, ‘Hybridity’, p. 81; Pieterse, ‘Hybridity, so what?’, p. 222. 
64 Anthias, ‘New hybridities’, p. 630; Mitchell ‘Different diasporas’, pp. 535-6. 
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In the next two sections we engage with the hybrid peace approach in terms of its 
ontological and epistemological foundations, its claim to break from liberal peace 
orthodoxy and its deployment of hybridity. The objective is not to prove the 
hybrid peace approach ‘won’t work’, but rather to show that by representing the 
always already hybrid world as hybrid in specific ways, it does particular work in a 
context of globalising liberal order. Recalling Cox’s adage that ‘theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose’,65 and given that representations of the social 
world are productive and constitutive of it,66 the question we explore is: what does 
the hybrid peace approach do? 
 
Hybridity as a problem solving tool 
 
Our argument is that ‘hybrid peace’, emerging as the answer to a problem of 
difference and alterity specific to the context in which the crisis of liberal 
peacebuilding manifests, is a problem-solving tool for the encompassment and 
folding into global liberal order of cultural, political and social orders perceived as 
radically different and recalcitrant to its expansion. We build our argument in two 
steps, first (in this section) showing how despite defining itself in contrast to 
liberal peace orthodoxy, the hybrid peace shares key assumptions, values and 
taxonomies with it; and, second, (in the next section) showing how in 
constructing the local and everyday as spaces of indigeneity and authenticity that 
are distinct from the international/global and in and from which peace can be 
built, the approach depoliticises and romanticises these in deeply consequential 
ways. This is not to deny the normative, even moral, imperatives that impel 
hybrid peace scholarship; however, as Doty points out,67 what is important are the 
taken-for-granted assumptions and naturalised categories of knowledge embedded 
in and produced by the advance of western power, and not the intentions and 
calculations of those who nonetheless bear some of the responsibility for this. 
 
Hybridity for liberal peace 
 
Although there are nuanced differences between individual scholars adopting the 
hybrid/post-liberal peace approach, there are important commonalities that define 
the field.68 To begin with, they share a broadly rationalist critique of the liberal 
                                                 
65 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, 
Millennium 10:2, (1981), pp. 126-155. 
66 E.g. Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial encounters: the politics of representation in North-South 
relations, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
67Doty, Imperial Encounters, p. 24. 
68 A key difference is the relative weight placed on hybridity, the local and/or the everyday. For 
example, Richmond (Post-Liberal Peace) focuses on the novel space produced by fusion of the 
local/everyday with the international, Mac Ginty (International Peacebuilding) on the ‘variable 
geometries’ of jostling indigenous and liberal orders, Mitchell (‘Quality control’) on the everyday, and 
Roberts (‘Beyond the metropolis?’) the basic needs of the populace. 
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peace,69 which they see as rooted in a narrow, biased set of interests, actors, 
institutions and norms and therefore incapable of connecting effectively or 
empathetically with the local, indigenous, non-liberal ‘subjects’ and quotidian 
world that liberal peace seeks to transform, rather than engage with.70 On the 
other side of this internationally-dominated order lies the ‘everyday’ as the set of 
actors, practices and institutions that constitute familial, religious, cultural, 
communal and locally associative life, a field disqualified by, but often stubbornly 
resistant to, liberal peace, alternately navigating, interrupting or defying the aims 
of international peacebuilders through the tricks, ruses and everyday practices that 
people deploy as a form of silent or clandestine everyday resistance.71 As 
Sabaratnam argues, this liberal/local distinction, turning on an underlying 
assumption of cultural difference, becomes ‘the central ontological fulcrum upon 
which the rest of the political and ethical problems sit.’72 Consequently, a kind of 
hybridity is seen at work, but one characterised by a politics of aphasia or 
disjuncture between, on the one hand, the top-down, universalising, technocratic, 
legal-rational operation of a western-dominated elite governmentality of liberal 
peace and, on the other, the everyday gemeinschaftlich cultural habitus of daily 
existence, affect, feeling and oral traditions of the ‘local’, the ‘indigenous’ and/or 
the everyday.73  
 
Hybridity and the everyday therefore become at once both a descriptive 
assessment of the disjuncture at work in the global-local peace interface and a 
prescriptive call for the harnessing of neglected and disqualified spaces for 
communicative action or ‘agonism’ that make for a more effective, encompassing 
and ‘emancipatory and empathetic form of peace.’74 It is descriptive because 
hybridity is seen as the ‘inevitable outcome of the liberal peace and its contextual 
engagements,’75 and prescriptive as hybridity is advanced as modality for an 
emancipatory project to demystify, deromanticise, uncover and understand the 
‘hidden’ subaltern script marginalised in mainstream liberal peace frameworks. 
                                                 
69 We say broadly rationalist as, despite the emphasis on interests, for some scholars there is 
recognition of the structural, systemic and ideological dimensions of liberal peace. E.g. Mac Ginty, 
International Peacebuilding, p. 45; Richmond, Post-Liberal Peace, pp. 8-9. 
70 Richmond, Post-Liberal peace, p. 3; Boege et al, ‘Building Peace’, p. 604; Mac Ginty, International 
Peacebuilding, pp. 41-2, 56. 
71 Ibid, pp. 13-19, 102; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, p. 10; Roberts, ‘Beyond the 
metropolis?’ p. 2541. However, Mitchell (‘Quality/Control’) defines the everyday as constituted by sets 
of ‘world building’ experiences, practices and interpretations involving both ‘international’ and ‘local’ 
actors. 
72 Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars’, p. 267, emphasis original; See relatedly, Bruno Charbonneau (2012) ‘War 
and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International Line’, International 
Peacekeeping, 19:4, 508-524. 
73 Richmond Post-Liberal Peace. pp. 11-19; Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance’, p. 23; Boege et al, 
‘Building Peace’, p. 603. 
74 Richmond Post-Liberal Peace, p. 15. 
75 Ibid, p. 17; Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance’, p. 24. 
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However, in a powerful sense, the hybrid peace approach is in denial of its 
prescriptive nature. Even as it identifies and constructs the ‘local’, ‘local-local’ and 
the ‘everyday’ as spaces for peace, this is also offered as a descriptive account of 
actually existing ‘indigenous or locally more authentic’ traditions, customs, 
practices and actors neglected and disqualified by the romanticised gaze of the 
international pursuing the ‘simulacra’ or ‘virtual’ apparatuses of liberal peace.76 Yet 
this claim to descriptive neutrality, a veritable ‘view from nowhere’, is impossible 
to maintain. Apart from the difficulty in social thought of maintaining rigid 
distinctions between fact and value, any act of taxonomic ordering and 
categorisation involves interpretative value judgements. In the case of hybrid 
peace, these are ultimately liberal values; as elaborated below, the process of 
inclusion and exclusion in categorising for hybrid peace what is in the 
international and what is local/indigenous and/or everyday; the normative 
treatment of the uses of force; the descriptive excavation of local and quotidian 
spaces; and the self-declared empathetic and emancipatory framework of hybrid 
peace itself are all informed by ambitions of liberal social transformation.77 
Hybridity is, after all, advanced as a way for generating a meaningful ‘social 
contract’ and inclusive citizenship frameworks deemed lacking in post-conflict 
spaces78 - a lack, moreover, attributed to liberal peacebuilding’s rigid emphasis on 
the socially unresponsive ‘virtual state’ and/or the endurance of problematic 
national orders dominated by corrupt and predatory elites deracinated from the 
personal, community, tradition, culture and everyday life.79 
 
The task, then, for international peacebuilders faced with persistent and recurrent 
resistance to liberal peace is to engage with and encompass these more 
‘indigenous’ social forms within a more nuanced and intensified power/knowledge 
framework, rendering them knowable and amenable to international 
peacebuilding practices - albeit ones now emphasising ‘empathy’ and ‘local 
legitimacy’, whether the local and everyday form the basis for more effective 
statebuilding or an international-local peacebuilding ‘contract’.80 As such, the 
everyday and the local are carved out by hybrid peace precisely so as to connect – 
‘collapse the distance’ between81 - the scholarly, developmental and diplomatic 
engagements of the international directly with an indigenous, subaltern social 
strata of the local, thereby bypassing the imposed and empty/virtual statist 
frameworks mediated by problematic national elites. It is in this way, regardless of 
self-declared intentions, that hybrid peace, emerging at the moment of crisis for 
                                                 
76 Ibid, pp. 9, 92-102; Mac Ginty ‘Hybrid Peace’, p. 403. 
77 See discussion in Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars’, pp. 266-8. 
78 Ibid, pp. 268-9. 
79 Boege et al, ‘Building Peace’ p. 606; Richmond Post-Liberal Peace, pp. 18,36; Roberts, ‘Beyond the 
metropolis?,’ p. 2542-2546. 
80 Ibid, pp. 611-2; Richmond, ‘Eirenism,’ pp. 564, 567-8; Roberts, ‘Beyond the metropolis?’, p. 2543. 
81 Richmond, Post-Liberal Peace, p. 101. 
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liberal peace, becomes the answer: it is hybridity for liberal peace. The core 
problem still is, after all, how to ‘make liberal states, institutionalism, and 
governance viable in everyday liberal and non-liberal contexts,’82 and, to illustrate, 
not only is there a casual reinsertion, as yardsticks for peace, of concepts such as 
democracy, human rights and rule of law that are core to liberal peace and at 
earlier points deemed marginal to post-liberal peace,83 but the key purchase for a 
reformed international peacebuilding is ‘the “local liberalism” or forms of 
tolerance and pluralism [to] be found in many societies emerging from civil war 
and authoritarianism’ that are presently overlooked or misrecognised and rejected 
by liberal peacebuilders.84 In this way, as Sabaratnam succinctly puts it, the hybrid 
peace is trapped in a ‘paradox of liberalism’ that ‘sees the liberal peace as 
oppressive but also the only true source of emancipation.’85  
 
As critics of the postcolonial school of hybridity had noted, part of the problem 
with the concept, despite its emancipatory intent, was a tendency to flatten out 
and even lose a clear sense of the coordinates of power relations within and 
between global, national and local orders. A key implication of locating in ‘hidden’ 
local agency both resistance to liberal peace and the possibility of ‘alternative’ 
hybrid forms of peace/building is the neglect of economic and social structures 
and, more generally, ‘how the international weighs heavily on the local’.86 To 
illustrate, amid the emphasis on the everyday, indigeneity, affect, ‘local legitimacy’ 
and so on, the hierarchical and penetrative order of globalising neoliberalism is 
lost. This is striking not only as this (focus on political economies inside post-
conflict states) is precisely the subject of a well developed critique,87 but, as Prabhu 
points out, ‘privileging what is hybrid in today’s world cannot, even 
parenthetically, leave out the moment of capitalism in which such a view is 
offered.’88 For example, as Charles R Hale shows, the 1990s shifts in Latin America 
from homogenizing citizenship (mestizaje) frameworks to limited versions of 
multiculturalism (as responses to intensifying indigenous struggles) were deeply 
interwoven with the coeval rise of neoliberal reform, in that they were advanced 
by agents of global neoliberal governance precisely as precautionary and pre-
emptive ceding of ‘carefully chosen ground in order to more effectively fend off 
                                                 
82 Richmond, ‘Eirenism’, p. 566; Boege at el, ‘Building Peace’, p. 600 
83 For Richmond, the envisaged ‘indigenous peace’ is one that ‘includes a version of human rights, rule 
of law, a representative political process that reflects the local groupings and their ability to create 
consensus, as well as broader international expectations for peace (but not alien ‘national’ interests).’ 
Richmond, ‘Eirenism’, p. 579; emphasis added. 
84 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding 17-18; Richmond Post-Liberal Peace, p. 141, 204. 
85 Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars’, p. 259. 
86 Chandler, ‘Peacebuilding’, p. 27; Jabri, ‘Peacebuilding’, p. 11; Peterson, ‘Conceptual Unpacking’, 
pp. 14-5. 
87 Cooper et al, ‘The end of history’, p12; Mohan and Stokke, ‘Participatory development’, pp. 258-9 
88 Prabhu, Hybridity, p. 2; Hall, ‘When was the ‘post-colonial’?’ pp. 257-8; Mitchell ‘Different 
diasporas’. 
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more far-reaching demands, and, even more important, to pro-actively shape the 
terrain on which future negotiations of cultural rights takes place.’89  
 
Despite recognition of the globe-spanning institutionalisation of neoliberal order,90 
the hybrid peace critique is nonetheless directed at what is seen as the misguided 
or blind tendency of liberal peacebuilders to impose its frameworks of ‘small state’, 
marketisation and self-reliance on populations struggling to survive in conditions 
of underdevelopment and post-war humanitarian crisis, thereby generating 
resistance to the wider peacebuilding effort.91 Yet, despite discussion of social 
democratic/welfarist state models, such prescriptions, as Belloni notes, are largely 
rejected as also complicit in the ‘top-down’ institution-centric logic of liberal 
peace.92 What is foregrounded instead is the primacy of a ‘new’ social contract 
derived from local preferences, customs, traditions and needs and/or the potential 
of customary and everyday forms of cooperation and care for the negotiated and 
consensual fashioning of social security, alongside temporary (‘transitional’) 
international provision of welfare for the most marginalised;93 indeed, hybridity is 
sometimes even offered as potentially speeding up implementation and local 
acceptance of neoliberal frameworks.94  
 
As such, the hybrid peace approach, rather than breaking with global liberal 
order-making, in fact represents an intensification of its governmental and 
biopolitical penetration into recalcitrant spaces. As Hale’s analysis shows, this is 
not novel, but well practiced: in Latin America ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’, as he 
terms it, is ‘predicated not on destroying the indigenous community to remake the 
Indian as citizen, but rather, re-activating the community as effective agent in the 
reconstitution of the Indian citizen-subject’, one shorn of radicalism and 
foundational for neoliberal rule.95 Moreover, this reconfiguration of global 
neoliberalism’s interface with indigenous resistance, while seemingly empathetic, 
in fact represents the enacting anew of clearly articulated limits distinguishing 
acceptable and unacceptable demands and, more importantly, structures the space 
for cultural rights activism by defining the language of contestation, what forms of 
political action are appropriate and even what it means to be indigenous or 
marginalised.96 As we show next, similar dynamics are at play in hybrid peace. 
 
                                                 
89 Hale, ‘Does Multiculturalism menace?’, p. 488; see also Mohan and Stokke, ‘Participatory 
development’, p. 255. 
90 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, p. 29-30; Richmond, Post-Liberal Peace, p. 38; Roberts, 
‘Beyond the metropolis’, p. 2542. 
91 Richmond, ‘Eirenism’, p. 578-9; Boege et al, ‘Building Peace’, p. 602. 
92 Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance’, p. 32. 
93 Richmond, Post-Liberal peace, pp. 38-9,45; Roberts, ‘Beyond the metropolis’, p. 2552. 
94 Ibid, p. 101; Roberts, ‘Beyond the metropolis’, pp. 2549-2554. 
95 Hale, ‘Does Multiculturalism menace?’, p. 496. 
96 Ibid, p. 490. 
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Break from orthodoxy? 
 
To begin with, liberal peace, as a globe-spanning project of unending reform with 
an ambition on a massive scale (the wholesale transformation of conflicted spaces, 
from state institutions to the individual ‘citizen’ and everything in between), is not 
blind or indifferent to local cultures, traditions and practices, but, rather, ‘has 
always been virulently disruptive of them and aggressively related to them as 
much in moral as in economic and military terms.’97 Liberal peace turns on liberal 
conceptions of the individual (a rational, interest-motivated economic ego) and 
the requisite conditions for human progress. Peace, then, is equivalent to the 
individual (citizen) being able to attain her full potential through her maximised 
liberty, and this is guaranteed only within the framework of a robust, democratic 
and market friendly state with a pluralist polity and cosmopolitan society. And yet 
those numerous deviations from liberal peace ideals that hybrid peace approaches 
identify as the ‘hybrid’ reality of international interventions, and claim as 
evidencing potential for accommodative peace, are not entirely unexpected 
consequences of ‘hidden’ local agency, but in fact often also constitute conscious 
and deliberate, if decidedly tactical, compromises by international interveners 
with an eye to eventual liberal transformation. As Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s fine-
grained study of Afghanistan shows, such compromises occurred daily in 
Washington, Kabul and myriad localities where coalition troops, development 
agencies and corporations interact with local partners, conditions, difficulties and 
opportunities.98 In a more systematic example, Elizabeth M Bruch shows how in 
post-conflict Bosnia the international community sought to create ‘deliberately 
hybrid’ (in both structure and function) institutions and practices, as well as a 
‘modern set of hybrid identities’ that would both meet international requisites and 
be domestically authentic.99 
 
What is contended here is that, while rejecting such ‘top-down’ strategies of 
liberal peacebuilding directed at the level of the state and the national in favour of 
an ostensibly empathetic and ‘agonistic’ engagement with the local and the 
everyday, hybrid peace approaches nonetheless deploy a similarly aggressive 
politics of inclusion and exclusion for peace. One immediate example is the 
normative treatment of violence (meaning, the use of force).100 While hybrid peace 
envisages a more expansive/holistic conception of (‘human’) security than liberal 
peace’s emphasis on strong state forces and institutions, both approaches rest 
implicitly or explicitly on the state’s (restored) monopoly over the use of force and 
                                                 
97 Dillon and Reid, ‘Global Governance’, p. 118; Peterson, ‘Creating Space’, pp. 321-3. 
98 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan, (Random House, 
2012). 
99 Bruch, ‘Hybrid Courts’. 
100 Keith Krause, ‘Hybrid Violence: Locating the Use of Force in post-Conflict Settings’, Global 
Governance 18:1, (2012), p. 2. 
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the rule of law, on the one hand, and ‘non-violent’ politics as the exclusive 
pathway to peace and emancipation, on the other.101 Thus whilst hybrid peace 
may eschew liberal peace’s state-centric discourses of ‘counter-
terrorism/insurgency’ and ‘securitised-development’, there is no room in either 
approach for emancipation through ‘armed struggle/resistance’, ‘wars of national 
liberation’ or ‘revolutionary wars’.102 As Bruno Charbonneau notes, the 
international/local distinction is integral to this normative categorisation that 
associates ‘violence’ with conflict (belligerents) whilst associating the violence of 
interveners, directed against the former, with peace (operations).103 However, as 
he shows, violence and its representations co-constitute and transform legitimacy, 
identity and agency, including redefining the very line between ‘local’ and 
‘international’. Relatedly, and more broadly, both peace approaches are similarly 
antagonistic to identity-based political projects, characterised as forms of elite-
driven ethnonationalism, separatism, fundamentalism, etc.104 With armed and 
‘ethnic’ conflict understood through depoliticising economistic frameworks105 as 
instrumentally driven by the acquisitive and self-serving motives and opportunity 
structures of conflict and ethnic ‘entrepreneurs’ in contexts (again economistic) of 
poverty and underdevelopment,106 the possibility of lasting (hybrid) peace is 
therefore to be found beyond these actors and projects, in forms of local and 
everyday civility, tolerance, cooperation, care, etc marginalised by particularist 
mobilisers and liberal peacebuilders alike.107 
 
The key consequence here is the a priori disqualification of the conflict claims, 
actions and state-centred goals of identity-based resistance movements, especially 
those using armed force, such that the political agency of, for instance, Kurds, 
Palestinians, Tamils, Kashmiris, Balochs and any other groups seeking 
emancipation and self-determination is dismissed as illegitimate and 
inauthentic,108 and the response to such ‘conflict’ dynamics is to eviscerate and 
reduce them to a depoliticised reading of, and operation upon, local/everyday 
                                                 
101 Roberts, ‘Beyond the metropolis’, p. 2544; Richmond, Post-Liberal Peace, p. 17; Outside work on 
violence in the everyday (e.g. Mitchell, ‘Quality/Control’), the hybridisation/co-constitution of 
violence and politics is neglected in the hybrid peace literature (Krause, ‘Hybrid Violence’); see 
relatedly, Charbonneau, ‘War and Peace’. 
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‘needs’ by international actors. Here too, despite emphasising affect, feeling and 
oral traditions in the cultural habitus of daily existence, the hybrid peace approach 
adopts the same rationalist logics as liberal peacebuilding in foregrounding the 
potential of individual self-interest and ‘basic needs’ for generating social 
contractarian ties of welfare and/or disincentivising recourse to violence and 
conflict.109 Moreover, as David Chandler argues, in locating the problem of elusive 
peace in hidden agency and inter-subjective attachments (i.e. ‘at the cognitive or 
ideational level’), hybrid peace approaches ‘reproduce the voluntarist and idealist 
underpinnings of liberal peace.’110 Amid the emphasis on dialogue, cooperation, 
accommodation, exchange, etc, between individuals and groups in the contexts of 
the local and the everyday, religious, ethnic and other identities become 
individualised attributes, rather than as representative and constitutive of social 
relations and orders spanning local, national and international levels.111 Relatedly, 
the hybrid peace approach’s emphasis on mobilising ‘everyday civic engagement’ 
to build peace at the grass roots is not different to liberal peace approach’s, here 
via frameworks of ‘civil society’, reconciliation, mediated interaction, etc.112 
Similarly the former’s emphasis on ‘local ownership’ and everyday capacities and 
modalities as alternatives to state institutions in constituting social ‘resilience’ is 
entirely in line with the latter’s emphasis on private sector-led development, self-
help, entrepreneurship and so on.113 As discussed below, these are all ways of 
governing/fostering life for liberal social order by ‘responsibilising’114 individuals 
and groups in their own wellbeing and emancipation.115 Consequently, another 
commonality is how the appropriate local agents for internationally assisted 
peacebuilding are identified i.e. those amenable to the dialogue, cooperation, 
tolerance and accommodation and non-violence that makes possible ethnic and 
religious coexistence and ‘locally negotiated’ peace, that, at the same time, can 
undermine the non-pacific and illiberal projects and designs of problematic ‘elites’ 
and conflict/ethnic entrepreneurs.116 In other words, the principles, categories and 
calculations that liberal peace operationalises at the state/national level (though 
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these are in practice implemented in dispersed localities) are inherent to hybrid 
peace, here in the contexts of the local and the everyday, albeit with added 
scepticism towards international-sponsored local agents deemed unrepresentative 
of the authentic/indigenous ‘local-local’.117 
 
In these ways, hybrid and liberal peace approaches discount the politics of liberal 
order’s peripheries through similar logics of inclusion and exclusion, and while the 
former is seemingly more accepting of non-liberal actors, practices and politics, its 
limits are also to be found in a liberal register. We develop this next through a 
critique of how hybrid peace carves out the local and everyday as constructs for 
peace. 
 
Depoliticising and romanticising the local 
 
What is striking about how hybridity, the everyday and the indigenous are 
conceptualised in reconfigured interfacing between these social orders and 
global/international order making is first, a neglect of the wider, multilectical 
character of hybridisation and, second, the presentist or short temporal frame 
adopted. Despite occasional acknowledgement of the wider and longue durée 
processes of hybridisation,118 there is nonetheless a tendency to neglect the 
hybridisation of earlier periods (including colonial ones) and instead focus on 
interactions in contemporary contexts of conflict and peacebuilding, and even 
where the significance of past hybridisation is acknowledged, to neglect its 
productive effects.119 For instance, Hoglund and Orjuela in discussing the 
‘international/domestic nexus’ inherent to ‘hybrid peace governance’ and ‘illiberal 
peacebuilding’ in Sri Lanka focus exclusively on actors and institutions at work in 
the post-war context since 2009, thereby neglecting the historical and productive 
miscegenation of the international and the local, liberalism and nationalism (see 
below).120 In discussing political orders in the former Yugoslavia, Mac Ginty seeks 
to ‘pay particular attention to the socialist era and its attempts to ‘manage’ the 
national question’ and to locate contemporary peacebuilding within the ‘much 
longer historical process of state formation and reformation,’121 yet he neglects the 
extent to which socialism and nationalism, including supra-national (Yugoslav) 
and ethno-regional variants, were profoundly interwoven in the post-WW2 
period.122 Socialism and nationalism, in this as in many contexts (e.g. Vietnam123), 
                                                 
117 Richmond, Post-Liberal Peace, p. 51; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, 187. 
118 Belloni, ‘Hybrid peace governance’, p. 23; Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, pp. 71-5. 
119 Boege et al, ‘Building peace’, p. 601. 
120 Kristine Höglund and Camilla Orjuela, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance and Illiberal Peacebuilding in Sri 
Lanka.’ Global Governance, 18:1 (2012), pp. 89-104. 
121 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, pp. 135-157. 
122 For example, while Mac Ginty argues political leaders ‘prioritised a single unifying identification 
(socialism) and sought to delegitimise other, ‘lesser’ identifications such as religion or nationalism,’ 
Jovic argues ‘the ideological narrative of Yugoslav communism in practice shielded and promoted 
Accepted (pre-proof) manuscript of: Nadarajah, Suthaharan and David Rampton 
(2015) ‘The limits of hybridity and the crisis of liberal peace’, Review of 
International Studies 41(1): pp 49 – 72 
 
 21 
were not mutually exclusive but historically co-constituted within these 
discourses and interactions with geo-strategic contexts and sets of founding 
memories.124 
 
What is left out therefore is precisely that which postcolonial and subaltern 
studies scholars emphasise as key to understanding political, social and cultural 
orders and dynamics of conflict in colonial and postcolonial societies; namely, the 
interconnections and mutual constitution that occur between them, particularly 
from the point at which colonial order seeks a more penetrative, albeit uneven, 
transformation of social order through state practices.125 In Sri Lanka, for example, 
the layered co-constitution since the nineteenth century of evolving liberal and 
nationalist power assemblages has coevally re/produced a majoritarian 
governmental nexus tying together (a very modern) state, territory and population 
as a Sinhala-Buddhist geo-body encompassing politics, economy, society and 
culture and hierarchical frontiers of inclusion and exclusion, and which the 
international community has, until very recently, celebrated and extensively 
engaged with as a promising, if yet incomplete, multi-ethnic liberal democracy 
with effective institutions and a market economy.126 Colonial and international 
(e.g. donor and I/NGO) practices pursuing liberal social transformation through 
frameworks of development, economy, security, and ethnic harmony have been 
always deeply interwoven with – i.e. both encompassing and being encompassed 
by - nationalist and racialised processes of state-building, demographic 
reengineering, securitised-development and counter-insurgency.127 Yet, the 
miscegenation of liberal and nationalist assemblages and practices in re/producing 
a majoritarian state and social order (in which Sinhala-Buddhists are located at the 
apex and Tamils, Muslims and others lower down), and the protracted and violent 
crisis consequent to Tamil resistance, are denied by presentist readings of places 
like Sri Lanka that categorise ethnic strife, armed conflict and authoritarianism 
(i.e. ‘illiberalism’) as endogenous, and international engagements for liberal peace, 
such as the 2002-2006 Norwegian-led peace process, as exogenous. 
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Despite criticism of liberal peace orthodoxy for such reductive categorisations, 
these reappear through the hybrid peace’s own inclusions and exclusions, as 
discussed above, and what is consistently posited as the basis for building peace, 
once these have done their work, is another binary schema that is ultimately 
reproductive of romanticised orderings of a fallen yet universalising modern 
power of the international, on the one hand, and a particular, prelapsarian, 
depoliticised world of the cultural, the traditional and the everyday devoid of 
ideology, on the other.128 Thus, despite occasional acknowledgement of the 
potential for the local to be illiberal and even oppressive,129 for the most part, 
hybridity-for-peace treats the local as a wellspring of neglected/overlooked 
indigenous cultural forms of progressive interaction, civility and cooperation, and 
ideologically unmediated demands and needs that together provide the grounds 
for generating an emancipatory social contract.130 
 
This is problematic in several ways. For example, it neglects the extent to which 
nationalism, liberalism and other (e.g. Islamic) governmental orders are 
reproduced through disseminated identificatory assemblages that work in and 
across social strata and at local as well as national, transnational and international 
levels.131 In contrast to rationalist accounts of nationalisms as elite-led projects 
‘from above’, the wider penetration and diffusion of nationalist subjectification 
and conduct are such that these are also powerfully reproduced by subaltern 
groups through social tendrils working across state and society, from elite to 
subaltern and peripheral spaces.132 Nationalist dynamics are not restricted to elite 
contestation, but, through processes of diffusion, also emerge and circulate within 
peripheral locales and everyday spaces, turning these into spaces of domination, 
discipline, resistance and hegemonic struggle.133 In the Sri Lankan case, the 
diffusion of Sinhala nationalist governmentality through a century of interwoven 
international and state discourses and practice (e.g. ‘national development’) has 
not stabilised social order, but produced both intra-group and subaltern-elite 
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contestation and, on the other hand, resistance by Tamils and Muslims navigating 
a territorialised and hierarchical majoritarian social complex.134 Thus, the local is a 
key site where, quite apart from at national and state levels (e.g. through law and 
policy), the latter are confronted in everyday life by exclusion, racism, discipline 
and violence, and thus in which emerge the dissipated resistances that make 
possible and cohere in (counter) nationalist political mobilisation and militancy – 
which also manifest through interwoven assemblages spanning the local, national, 
transnational and international.135  
 
Such dynamics are entirely lost in the depiction of the local as a non-elite, 
subaltern space of supposedly inherent, as opposed to socially constructed, 
indigeneity - by which we mean how nationalist and other governmentalities 
circulating in the local and the everyday work through and are productive of 
conceptions of ‘indigeneity’, ‘local legitimacy’ and ‘authenticity’.136 In Sri Lanka, 
for example, contestations over indigeneity itself are foundational to the 
protracted and violent crisis, given how indigeneity is both derived from and 
marshalled into claims to either a naturalised ancient and territorially integral 
island space for the protection and fostering of Sinhala Buddhist life, and by which 
Tamils and Muslims are recent and threatening interlopers from homelands 
elsewhere (e.g. India), or, conversely, to equally naturalised historical homelands 
in the island’s Northeast,137 contestations deeply interwoven with 
international/state discursive practices related to sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
devolution, power-sharing, etc. Moreover, neither are the cultural and the 
‘traditional’ separate from the political or the state; as Bruce Kapferer notes, 
‘nationalism fetishizes culture’.138 For example, not only did founding texts of 
Sinhala nationalist mythology drafted by Buddhist monks draw substantive 
content from ‘localised folk traditions’, but such ‘folk knowledge’ itself is 
reproduced through continuous dissemination (including through school and 
popular texts) as part of a ‘nationalist enterprise’,139 and state sponsorship has been 
key to revitalising ‘declining rural traditions’, encouraging Buddhist worship (as an 
expression of Sinhala identity) and popularising as sites of pilgrimage 
‘rediscovered’ archaeological sites linked to nationalist myths.140 Moreover, such 
dynamics are inseparable from the international – for example, the colonial-era 
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advent of print capitalism in turning folk knowledge into ‘common knowledge’ 
and British historiography’s validation of Sinhala nationalist narratives, or, in the 
1980s, UNESCO’s recognition of state-designated ‘Sacred Cities’ (Anuradhapura 
and Kandy) and ‘Ancient Cities’ (Polonnaruwa and Sigiriya) as world heritage 
sites. 
 
Yet, hybrid peace’s ontological bases serve to efface the significance of the state 
and the national (and, for that matter, the international) from a number of 
contexts in the global South, particularly their role in the reproduction of a potent 
territorialised nexus of people, state and nationalist identity, and its workings as a 
set of apparatuses recycling socially hegemonic and diffuse conceptions of this 
nexus. Instead, as noted above, discussion of the state is sometimes absent and at 
other times the state is reduced to a Westphalian metanarrative advanced by 
international peacebuilders and their local elite allies and at best to a ‘placebo’ or 
‘simulacra’ created by international statebuilding.141 Yet as nationalism scholars 
and critics of postcolonial works on hybridity have discussed, there is a significant 
seam of desire for ‘modernization and nationalism in the Third World’ which still 
propels in many contexts, local and national, ideological conceptions of and desires 
for statehood,142 a desire driven by the enduring legacy of historical (colonial and 
postcolonial) dynamics, global and local disparities, and the territorial framework 
venerated by international state-builders. Integral to these dynamics and the 
desire for the form of the state they reproduce is the often fraught relationship 
between majority and minority, subaltern and elite, centre and peripheral social 
strata that manifest in struggles spanning local, national, transnational and 
international levels. 
 
In sum, the hybrid peace approach’s neat divisions between the local/everyday and 
the international/liberal deny the extent to which the disciplinary, the 
governmental and the biopolitical have inexorably, if unevenly, invested 
international, national and local orders over the longue durée. Nationalist, liberal 
and other political rationalities operate not only through elite or state practices, 
but circulate and diffuse through myriad everyday and cultural practices to 
permeate and colonise the local, and at the same time, ‘boomerang’ from there to 
‘governmentalise’ state and international (e.g. donor and NGO) practices. 
Moreover, hybridity and hybridisation are not restricted to orders of peace but are 
also immanent in the dynamics of conflict and nationalist struggle which 
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proliferate in everyday spaces and locales where national, international and 
transnational relations of power clash and yet co-constitute one another. 
 
The point is not that hybrid peace scholars are oblivious to such dynamics, but 
that the approach nonetheless turns on categorising and constructing (aspects of) 
the local and everyday as sufficiently outside, or beyond the reach of, the 
governmental and the biopolitical as to constitute an autonomous space for both 
resistance to hierarchy, exclusion and repression and global-local engagement for 
peace. This denies the penetrative potency of interwoven international-national-
local configurations of power and identity-formation; ignores the salience and 
force within the everyday and ‘local’ of identity-based aspirations to, and 
contestations over, nationhood, statehood and modernisation; and places 
untenable weight on everyday interaction, dialogue, cooperation, etc to generate 
resistance to these. As such, this is a very partial, romanticised and prescriptive 
account of the ‘local-local’ that simultaneously makes a case for (reconfigured) 
international peace interventions, thus offering the biggest clue to the normative 
teleological aims of hybrid peace as a problem-solving tool for a liberal order in 
crisis. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What we have argued is that hybrid peace is less a radical critique of liberal peace 
than a ‘variation on a governmental theme’, to borrow Hindess’ turn of phrase,143 
in that hybrid peace constitutes a specific programmatic response (international-
local hybridity) to a specific problematisation (legitimacy) of the various 
resistances frustrating expansion of global liberal governmentality.144 Yet it is 
precisely at this point that a sense of what will be eventually assembled from 
drawing together supposedly distinct pieces remains unclear.145 The state and 
territorial order is, on the surface at least, jettisoned in favour of, in one key 
proposal, an ‘international-local peacebuilding contract’.146 However, first, this 
signifies the re-entry of the liberal peace’s frameworks and strategic complexes 
into the supposedly isolated and unmediated spheres of the ‘local’ and everyday. 
Proposed as the appropriate levels, as opposed to the state and the national, in 
which the foundations of global stability (as a plurality of hybrid peace) should be 
enacted and secured, these provide the ‘fields of visibility’ by which the capacities 
and conduct reproductive of liberal order may yet, and more effectively, be 
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identified and fostered or, conversely, those that are problematic be marginalised 
and undermined. In that sense, the greater emphasis on empathy, legitimacy and 
emancipation in a reconfigured international-local interface also represents an 
intensified ‘responsibilisation’ of the subaltern and the marginalised in securing 
their own liberation, and it is not coincidental that the turn to hybridity in 
peacebuilding scholarship and praxis comes amid the crisis-induced reduction or 
even withdrawal of international assemblages and ambitions in several parts of the 
periphery.147 Second, despite all the emphasis on the local and against the state in 
hybrid peace, the ‘bottom up’ forging of a ‘locally legitimate’ social contract is still 
the basis for producing the stable state-society relations and territorial state order 
on which liberal order rests. Moreover, hybridity as a modality for peace is tied to 
a (liberal) politics of inclusion and exclusion that categorises those to be 
emancipated and those from whom, a perspective and practice that all-too-often 
leaves intact and even enables oppressive social hierarchies and orders. What is 
key here is that in directing attention away from the state and toward the local 
and everyday, and yet retaining the ideal end of ‘one state, one nation, one citizen’ 
it shares with liberal peace, the hybrid peace blinds itself to the grounding in these 
spaces of the internationalised territorialised nexus of people, state and nationalist 
identity, and its role in the reproduction of oppression, resistance and violence. 
 
In these ways, and echoing earlier criticisms of hybridity, the hybrid peace is 
perfectly given over to the ‘consecration of hegemony’. The example of Rwanda’s 
Gacaca courts is a case in point; Phil Clark’s fine-grained analysis shows how a 
‘traditional’ (but in fact always externally influenced) form of community-based 
justice was appropriated, adapted and strategically deployed by the state and 
international donors, for purposes it was never envisaged - accountability for mass 
atrocities, as an integral part of a 21st century project of state- and disciplinary 
nation-building.148 Everyday modalities (courtyard courts, truth telling, 
community-selected judges, etc) were adapted (state training for judges, issuance 
of formal laws, etc) and institutionalised into a system which was trialled, refined 
and then rolled out countrywide. This explicitly ‘hybrid’ organisation of 
‘traditional’ justice, predicated on mass participation (which many Rwandans 
describe as a duty to the government, or ‘doing the government’s work’), emerged 
as the answer to very modern problems of state capacity (e.g. massive 
overcrowding of prisons) and national identity construction: the official narrative 
governing contemporary Gacaca attributes the 1994 genocide to the disruption by 
‘outsiders’ (including past Hutu leaders) of a claimed past Rwandan ‘unity’ and 
‘values’ that popular participation in Gacaca is to rebuild. 
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Given that the turn to hybridity, the local and the everyday in peace studies flows 
from a normative impulse to respond to disastrous consequences of persistently 
failing international peace interventions, the critique advanced above begs the 
question as to what might constitute a genuinely ‘critical’ response? Although we 
do not have easy answers to this challenge, and none that are universally 
applicable, a starting point for a more self-reflexive approach might be the 
problems, common to liberal peace and hybrid peace, with how agency, identity, 
the state and violence are read. Any normative, let alone critical, perspective 
begins with conceptions of social and political justice that inform its emancipatory 
ambition. However, rather than deriving from a universal, liberal-humanist 
abstraction, we would argue these must emerge out of the specific contexts of 
historically co-constituted oppression and resistance; in other words, it is with 
struggle, rather than peace, that critical analysis must begin. Relatedly, as recent 
critical works argue, a will to emancipation necessarily entails an agonistic mode 
of engagement.149 What is therefore advocated here is a historically informed and 
context sensitive scholarly engagement that focuses on, and is prepared to 
explicitly position itself within, the interwoven and often violent dynamics of 
domination and resistance. Liberal and hybrid peace approaches do, of course, 
‘take sides’, but in applying a liberal register to questions of agency, identity and 
peace, they serve to undermine resistance and reinforce domination by dismissing 
as antithetical to peace forms of organisation and popular mobilisation through 
which subaltern agency often manifests, and by limiting tolerance for difference 
to ambitions of cosmopolitan state and social order. 
 
However, an emancipatory approach, as postcolonial scholars have argued,150 
necessitates, first, creating space for activism, which does not mean either more 
‘civil society’ or the fragmented possibilities of ‘local-local’ and ‘everyday’ 
interaction, but engaging seriously with those forms of political organisation and 
mobilisation that resistance generates, often against the odds.151 This is not to deny 
that self-determination, Islamic and revolutionary movements, for example, can 
be also oppressive and otherwise problematic, but key to the recurrence of the 
crisis of liberal order, we would argue, is the a priori disqualification (of the 
salience for ‘peace’) of such actors, their claims and their projects, alongside the 
forbearance and support routinely extended to the states they oppose. Relatedly, a 
critical response entails greater focus on, and not a turn away from, interwoven 
state and international practices, and their treatment not as ‘above’ or exogenous 
to the reproduction of domination, resistance and struggle, but, rather, as 
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historically and deeply integral to these. Third, it necessitates an engagement with 
identity that includes a preparedness to embrace what has been awkwardly 
labelled ‘strategic essentialism’,152 wherein identity-oriented politics and projects 
are not simply dismissed in pursuit of cosmopolitan dreams of total fluidity. 
Recognising the always hybrid character of social existence does not mean, as Hall 
points out, ‘that because essentialism has been deconstructed theoretically, 
therefore it has been displaced politically’.153 The danger of emphasising collective 
identity is, of course, that of ‘re-othering’, but as Simone Drichel argues, this is a 
risk that has to be taken because what is needed to overturn the hierarchy 
encoded in the self/other binary, ‘in the first instance at least, is an intervention on 
the very level of the binary, that is, on the level of collective, not individual, 
identity’.154 Moreover, the possibility of emancipation rests not on dismantling 
identity and refashioning it for civic order, whether by more effective state-
building or through local-local dialogue and a ‘new social contract’, but by treating 
identity as powerfully co-constituted by the interwoven dynamics of hegemony 
and counter-hegemony, oppression and resistance. In sum, it is only by 
incorporating the full range of levels and forms of power and identity, and how 
these are historically co-constituted across and through these levels, that a 
sensitive, contextualised and critical reading is possible of how the crisis of liberal 
peace reproduces itself. 
                                                 
152 See discussion in Krishna, ‘The importance of being ironic’. 
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